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ETHICAL CONDUCT IN A JUDICIAL
CAMPAIGN: IS CAMPAIGNING AN ETHICAL
ACTIVITY?
I. INTRODUCTION
A duty of ethical conduct restricts the manner in which attorneys man-
age their professional affairs. This ethical duty pervades all phases of the
activities undertaken by members of the bar. '
The professional activities of attorneys include running for judicial of-
fice. 2 As a consequence of their duty of ethical conduct, candidates for a
judicial post, unlike non-lawyers running for partisan political office, 3
1. Note, for example, the statement of the Washington Supreme Court: "These [ethical] rules
permeate all aspects of an attorney's life, whether he be engaged in the active practice of law, cam-
paigning for a political position or adjudicating disputes as a judge." In re Donohoe, 90 Wn. 2d 173,
180, 580 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1978). Likewise, the American Bar Association's rules governing attor-
ney conduct "define the type of ethical conduct that the public has a right to expect ... in all matters
pertaining to professional employment." Preliminary Statement to ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY (emphasis added).
The requirements of legal ethics also apply to activities of attorneys outside the scope of their
professional lives. See, e.g., WASH. DISCIPLINE RULES FOR ATTORNEYS 1.1(a) (premises disciplinary
action upon, inter alia, "[tihe commission of any action involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or
corruption, whether the same be committed in the course of his relations as an attorney, or other-
wise"); ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, RECENT ETHICS OPINIONS, No.
336 (1974) ("[A] lawyer must comply at all times with all applicable disciplinary rules of the Code of
Professional Responsibility whether or not he is acting in his professional capacity").
2. As of 1976, 12 states used partisan elections and 13 used nonpartisan elections to select judges
to their courts of highest appeal. P. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 257 n.6 (1980). Lower court
positions also commonly are elective. See S. Escovrrz, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 17-42
(1975) (survey by state of method of court selection).
In Washington, court positions at all levels are filled by nonpartisan elections in the state general
election. See WASH. CONST. art. 4, §§ 3, 5, 10, 30; WASH. REv. CODE §§ 2.04.071, .06.070, .08.-
060, 3.04.010,.14.020, 29.21.070 (1979).
In pursuit of election, judicial candidates frequently engage in controversy in order to attract more
votes. As one judge reflected:
Because the electorate is uninformed, a judicial candidate is tempted to make sensational state-
ments, which he hopes will call the voters' attention to his candidacy and at the same time
appeal to what he believes to be the majority view. I know one judge who campaigned through-
out the state announcing that he was for the death penalty, another who promised that if elected
he would "take the handcuffs off the police," another whose television advertisement showed
him, in his robes, slamming shut a prison door.
Spaeth, Reflections on a Judicial Campaign, 60 JUD. 10, 13 (1976). Further, judicial campaigns
sometimes reduce to "campaign oratory that a Judge is a 'strict constructionist' or 'civil righter' or a
'liberal' or 'conservative' or 'hard' or 'soft' or 'compassionate' with respect to persons charged with
crime." Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 438 F. Supp. 599, 606 (E.D. La.), rev'd, 565 F.2d 295 (5th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
3. Attorneys who are candidates for partisan political office are also subject to considerations of
legal ethics. See State v. Russell, 227 Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983
(1980) (attorney censured for campaign acts while running for local utilities board); ABA COMM. ON
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must limit the activities they undertake in furtherance of their candida-
cies.
The purpose of this comment is twofold. First, through a comprehen-
sive survey of the codes that comprise the sources of legal ethics, the
comment elucidates a body of ethical law governing the conduct of candi-
dates in a judicial campaign. Second, after identifying the basic principle
found to underlie these ethical codes, this comment argues that the scope
of permissible judicial campaigning should be strictly confined.
II. THE SOURCES OF LAW OF LEGAL ETHICS
The law of legal ethics consists of the codes that, by court order or by
legislative act, each jurisdiction adopts as the body of rules governing the
conduct of its bar.4 Although these codes vary from state to state, in gen-
eral they are patterned upon model versions developed and promulgated
by the American Bar Association. 5 The Code of Professional Responsi-
bility (CPR), 6 the broadest of these rules, addresses those problems of
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, RECENT ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 1366 (1976) (attorney-
candidate for United States Senate subjected to tests of legal ethics regarding lawyer publicity). How-
ever, the scope of this comment is limited to campaigns for judicial office.
4. These ethical rules. "having been adopted and promulgated by this court as the rules which
govern professional conduct of those practicing law in this jurisdiction, are of dignity and status equal
to any other rule this court has adopted." In re Chantry, 67 Wn. 2d 190. 193. 407 P.2d 160. 161
(1965).
The function of regulating legal practice is often said to be inherent in judicial systems. Al-
though the function has been ostensibly delegated to the courts by legislation in some states, the
basic theory is that all courts have inherent power to regulate practice before them, and thus to
determine who may. or may not, engage in such practice. That power has been extended to all
aspects of the practice of law, and is not just limited to determining who may represent others
before a court. This appears to have been a natural concomitant consequence of the development
of the legal profession in the United States.
Lumbard, Setting Standards: The Courts, the Bar. and the Lawyers' Code of Conduct. 30 CATH.
U.L. REV. 249, 249-50 (1981). In Washington, the judicial power to regulate the bar derives directly
from the state constitution. Graham v. Bar Ass'n, 86 Wn. 2d 624, 631-33, 548 P.2d 310. 315-16
(1976).
5. Since these codes originate in professional organizations of lawyers with vested interests in the
outcomes, arguably they cannot be deemed to concern "ethics." at least not in the philosophical
sense of the word. See note 13 itfra. Note, however, that in the United States the term "unethical"
has come to mean conduct in violation of the accepted code of a profession or business. H.W.
FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 171 (2d ed. 1965).
6. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter cited as CPRI. Adopted by
the American Bar Association in 1967. the CPR, in original or modified form. has been adopted by
the courts of every state but California as the set of rules governing the conduct of the legal profes-
sion. Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62
MINN. L. REV. 619, 632 (1978). The Washington Supreme Court adopted the CPR in 1971 as a rule
of court, subsequently modifying and amending it. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 2.48.230 (1979).
Violation of the CPR subjects an attorney to disciplinary sanction. WASH. DISCIPLINE RULES FOR
ATTORNEYS 1. 1(i). Violation is also a breach of the Oath of Attorney and of the Washington State Bar
Act. WASH. RULES FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE 5.G.3: WASH. REV. CODE § 2.48.220(1) (1979).
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professional ethics encountered primarily by the practicing attorney. The
Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC), 7 the other principal model code, deals
with the ethics of the bench. These codes by no means exhaust the scope
of ethical problems that attorneys as individuals might encounter. Never-
theless, the CPR and CJC, along with other incidental bar rules, 8 consti-
tute the primary authority upon which the legal profession relies in an-
swering its questions of ethics. Therefore, it is to these sources that this
comment shall look in analyzing the ethics of judicial campaigns.
7. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT [hereinafter cited as CJC]. Adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1972 as the set of rules governing the conduct of the bench, by 1978 the CJC or a
similar code had been adopted by the courts of 43 states and the District of Columbia. Throde, The
Code of Judicial Conduct-The First Five Years in the Courts, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 395, 395 n.5,
395-96. The CJC was adopted by the Washington Supreme Court in 1974.
8. These other bar rules pertain primarily to administrative matters and consequently are of small
importance as sources of substantive ethical law. Further, even in those aspects in which they are
relevant, these sources do little more than duplicate parallel provisions of the CPR and hence add
little to the analysis.
The Discipline Rules for Attorneys make acts involving "moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corrup-
tion" or demonstrating unfitness to practice law subject to disciplinary sanction. WASH. DISCIPLINE
RULES FOR ATrORNEYS 1.1(a), (k). These provisions are duplications of proscriptions in DR 1-102 of
the CPR. See note 12 and accompanying text infra. As noted in the discussion of DR 1-102, such
provisions define only the minimum behavior necessary to avoid sanction and therefore do not help
delimit the scope of ethical campaign activity. See note 13 and accompanying text infra. The Disci-
pline Rules were adopted by the Washington Supreme Court in 1975. The sanctions for their violation
are censure, reprimand, suspension, disbarment, and transfer to inactive status. WASH. DISCIPLINE
RULES FOR ATrORNEYS 1.2.
Under the Oath of Attorney, lawyers have a duty to "maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers." WASH. RULES FOR ADMISSIONTO PRACTCE 5.G.4. Use here of the word
"due" is subject to several interpretations. The requirement should probably be taken, however, to
mean simply that considerations of fairness to the judge and of preserving the decorum of the judici-
ary's public face are to be given "due" weight in assessing the ethics of actions that affect the bench.
Such an interpretation supports the general purposes of legal ethics and makes for a workable stan-
dard of enforcement of the Oath. In this respect, the duty imposed by the Oath is simply a generalized
formulation of the CPR duty under Canon 8 to refrain from undue criticism of the bench. See section
II.A.3 infra. Although the obligation of "due respect" thus has great bearing on the question of
ethical campaigning, the issue in its relevant aspects is more appropriately treated in the discussion of
that Canon. Swearing to the Oath of Attorney is a requirement of admission to the Washington bar.
WASH. RULES FOR ADMISSION TO PRACnCE 5.E. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 2.48.210 (1979). Vio-
lation of the Oath is a ground for disciplinary sanctions. WASH. DISCIPLINE RULES FOR ATrORNEYS
1. 1(c). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 2.48.220(3) (1979).
In addition to the rules of legal ethics surveyed in this comment, there may be financial disclosure
or other statutory election requirements that apply to judicial campaigns. See, e.g., WASH. REV.
CODE § 42.17.030 (1979).
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A. The Code of Professional Responsibili, 9
The CPR is the principal source of ethical duties applicable to the cam-
paign activities of non-incumbent judicial candidates. 10 The specific issue
of campaign conduct, however, receives little explicit treatment in the
CPR. Consequently, the attorney-candidate must look to general rules
and standards of the CPR that do not expressly address the issue of judi-
cial campaigning in order to assess the ethics of proposed campaign acts.
Three such rules and standards pertain to the types of activities that judi-
cial candidates might undertake in the course of a campaign: (1) standards
of general attorney behavior; (2) restrictions on publicity; and (3) limita-
9. See generally note 6 supra. The CPR has a tripartite organization: "'Canons." "Ethical Con-
siderations" (EC's), and -Disciplinary Rules" (DR's). The three parts. as explained in the CPR. are
differentiated as follows:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of
professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public .... They em-
body the general concepts from which the Ethical Consideration and Disciplinary Rules are de-
rived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward
which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of principles upon
which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character. The
Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action.
Prelininar)" Statement to CPR (footnote omitted). For background behind the development of the
CPR's three-part structure, see Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and
Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1970). For a consideration of the character of the obligation imposed
by the Ethical Considerations, see notes 13 & 17 infra.
10. Because the CPR's provisions address only the acts of "a lawyer," it is not apparent whether
the CPR is meant to reach the acts of incumbent judges. But see In re Donohoe. 90 Wn. 2d 173, 180,
580 P.2d 1093. 1096 (1978) (dictum) (The CPR's requirements "permeate all aspects of an attor-
ney's life ... [including] adjudicating disputes as a judge"). In general, the issue will not arise since
the courts are not dependent upon the CPR for the discipline of members of the bench. Nevertheless.
the CPR's Disciplinary Rules sometimes have been extended to reach those judicial acts that. due to
the judge's resignation from the bench prior to the disciplinary proceeding. would otherwise be un-
susceptible of judicial control. E.g.. In re Vasser, 75 N.J. 357, 382 A.2d 1114, 1116 (1978): State ex
rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Sullivan. 596 P.2d 864, 866-67 (Okla. 1979). In at least one case. the CPR
was made to reach judicial acts even while the judge remained on the bench. In re Littell, 260 Ind.
187.294 N.E.2d 126. 130 (1973). See also lt re Simmons, 65 Wn. 2d 88. 94.395 P.2d 1013. 1016
(1964) (Judge of a non-court-of-record disbarred under former Canons of Professional Ethics: -'[AI
judge thereof, although prohibited by statute (RCW 35.20.170) from the practice of law during his
tenure, remains a member of the bar of this state (RCW 2.48.021)").
As a general proposition, courts have been willing to discipline incumbent judges qua attorneys for
misconduct during their tenure in judicial office, at least where "moral turpitude" is involved. E.g.,
State ex rel. Dill v. Martin, 45 Wash. 76, 89, 87 P. 1054, 1056-57 (1906). See generall' Annot.. 57
A.L.R. 3d 1150 (1974). Further, even if not serving as the basis for the order of discipline itself, the
CPR may still be relevant as a standard by which to measure the propriety of a judge's conduct. See.
e.g., In re Donohoe, 90 Wn. 2d 173, 180, 580 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1978) ("We feel that the minimum
dignity appropriate to judicial office is that the lawyer, judge, orjudicial candidate abide by the Code
of Professional Responsibility").
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tions on criticisms of the bench made by members of the bar. In addition
to these general rules of conduct, several measures under Canon 8 of the
CPR specifically address the question of ethical campaign conduct.
1. Standards of General Attorney Conduct
A number of measures under the CPR prescribe standards of conduct
applicable to all forms of professional activity. These require that attor-
neys act so as to preserve for the bar a seemly and professional image in
the public eye. "1 Pursuant to this policy, for example, Ethical Considera-
tion (EC) 1-5 directs that an attorney's conduct be "temperate and digni-
fied," and EC 9-6 requires an attorney to "conduct himself so as to re-
flect credit on the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect,
and trust ... of the public."
The CPR includes a rule of minimum conduct that serves as an unam-
biguous floor on the bounds of attorney conduct consistent with these
general ethical standards. In any setting, an attorney's actions must not
amount to misconduct within Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102, which pro-
scribes illegal or dishonest acts. 12 DR 1-102, however, contributes very
little to a substantive delineation of the scope of ethical campaign con-
duct. Something more than the minimum is required for a candidate's
behavior to be ethical. 13 Judicial candidates must comport with the CPR's
11. For example, EC 9-2 states that "[p]ublic confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer .... [A] lawyer should determine his conduct by acting
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the
legal profession." (footnote omitted). Analogously, EC 1-5 bases its disparagement of even slight
violations of law by attorneys on the apprehension that these "may tend to lessen public confidence in
the legal profession." See CPR EC 9-1, EC 9-6. See also CPR EC 8-1 (the legal system "should
function in a manner that commands public respect").
In imposing disciplinary sanctions upon attorneys, the courts have continually stressed this need to
maintain public respect for the legal system. E.g., Jackson v. State Bar, 23 Cal. 3d 509, 591 P.2d 47,
50, 153 Cal. Rptr. 24, 27 (1979); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Ky.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981); In re Albright, 274 Or. 815, 549 P.2d 527, 529 (1976);
In re Cary, 90 Wn. 2d 762, 766, 585 P.2d 1161, 1163 (1978); In re Case, 59 Wn. 2d 181, 184, 367
P.2d 121, 122-23 (1961). In Case, the court stated: "Disciplinary proceedings ... are not prose-
cuted primarily to punish the offender, but to curb disrespect for the profession, to maintain its honor
and dignity .... "Id.
12. "A lawyer shall not: ... (3) Engage in illegal conduct involving mortal turpitude. (4) En-
gage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. . . . (6) Engage in any
other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." CPR DR 1-102(A) (footnotes
omitted).
13. The term "ethical" is used here in its moral philosophical sense, referring to the "challenge
of excellence" that determines the conduct of those interested in realizing their fullest capabilities. It
corresponds with what Professor Fuller has labelled the "morality of aspiration," which, as a source
of human motivation, stands opposed to the pressures of deterrence caused by the fear of disciplinary
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ethical directives, which charge an attorney with maintaining "the high-
est standards of ethical conduct"1 4 and with "uphold[ing] the integrity
and honor of his profession." 15
The vagueness of these general ethical standards serves to delegate to
attorney-candidates a great deal of personal discretion in deciding what is
ethical conduct. In practice, custom undoubtedly operates as a norm by
which to evaluate the exercise of this discretion. Custom, however, is an
insufficient basis for evaluating the propriety of a proposed action.
Rather, the starting point of a candidate's analysis should be whether the
action's effect will be to promote or to harm public faith in the bar. Con-
duct tending to tarnish public faith in the integrity and efficiency of the
bar should be beyond a candidate's ethical liberty unless it can be justified
sanction (the "'morality of duty"). L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 5-13 (rev. ed. 1969). Profes-
sor Fuller explains:
The morality of aspiration is most plainly exemplified in Greek philosophy. It is the morality
of the Good Life, of excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers. In a morality of
aspiration there may be overtones of a notion approaching that of duty. But these overtones are
usually muted, as they are in Plato and Aristotle. Those thinkers recognized. of course, that a
man might fail to realize his fullest capabilities. As a citizen or as an official, he might be found
wanting. But in such a case he was condemned for failure, not for being recreant to duty. for
shortcoming, not for wrongdoing. Generally with the Greeks instead of ideas of right and
wrong. of moral claim and moral duty. we have rather the conception of proper and fitting
conduct, conduct such as beseems a human being functioning at his best.
Where the morality of aspiration starts at the top of human achievement, the morality of duty
starts at the bottom. . . . It does not condemn men for failing to embrace opportunities for the
fullest realization of their powers. Instead. it condemns them for failing to respect the basic
requirements of social living.
Id. at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
Note that the conception of the two moralities elucidated by Professor Fuller is strongly mirrored in
the bifurcation of the CPR into "Ethical Considerations" and "Disciplinary Rules. " See Prelininarv
Statement to CPR. reprinted in part in note 9 supra: Wright. supra note 9. at 10 n.26. As with the
"morality of aspiration," the CPR acknowledges that "lelach lawyer must find within his own con-
science the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his actions should rise above mini-
mum standards." Preamble to CPR. But want of sanction in the Ethical Considerations does not bear
on their authoritativeness as sources of obligation. But see note 17 infra. The threat of professional
sanction is not the relevant determinant of the conduct of an attorney who is interested in his or her
own human excellence. In reference to the Disciplinary Rules. as stated by the chairman of the com-
mittee that drafted the CPR:
A lawyer who complies with these minimum standards may be an ethical lawyer only in a margi-
nal sense, for he may have failed to conform to the higher ideals and traditions of the profession
The IDisciplinary] Rules are to be firmly and uniformly enforced: but a lawyer, to be deserving
of the approbation of his fellow man, must conform to higher standards than those set forth in
the Rules.
Wright. supra note 9, at 1I.
14. Preamble to CPR (emphasis added). See CPR EC 1-5 ("A lawyer should maintain high
standards of professional conduct").
15. CPR EC9-6.
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by reference to some other factor. 16 It should thus be possible to discern
objective limits on the scope of discretion entrusted to the candidate.
Nevertheless, the courts have shown little willingness to recognize such
boundaries and have found grounds to discipline judicial candidates only
for violations of other, more specific rules. 17
16. Given that a campaign act is otherwise ethical, it is difficult to conceive of any possible
justification for performing that act in a manner that is harmful to public faith in the legal system. Cf.
In re Simmons, 71 Wn. 2d 316, 319, 428 P.2d 582, 585 (1967) (A lawyer "has a right as a member
of a free society to express his views; however, as a representative of the legal profession, a lawyer
has a duty not to express those views irresponsibly and in a manner which will bring discredit upon
the profession and the courts"). But cf. CPR EC 9-2:
While a lawyer should guard against otherwise proper conduct that has a tendency to diminish
public confidence in the legal system or in the legal profession, his duty ... to the public should
never be subordinate merely because the full discharge of his obligation may be misunderstood
or may tend to subject him or the legal profession to criticism.
17. In general, only egregious instances of attorney misconduct are susceptible of disciplinary
action. The immediate practical reason for this limitation is built into the CPR itself: only violations
of Disciplinary Rules are subject to disciplinary sanctions; and these rules in general delineate only
patently unethical forms of behavior. Nevertheless, some courts have been willing to use their inher-
ent powers of regulation over the bar to depart from the CPR's disciplinary regime, including basing
disciplinary action upon the CPR's Ethical Considerations. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Dawson, 318
So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1975) (disbarment action grounded on violation of EC 5-8); Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics v. Durham, 279 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1979) (reprimand and admonishment based upon
violations of EC 1-5 and EC 9-6, requiring lawyers to be "temperate and dignified" and to avoid
"even the appearance of impropriety"); cf. City Council v. Sakai, 58 Hawaii 390, 570 P.2d 565, 572
(1977) ("[CPR] disciplinary rules establish only minimum standards and may not foreclose the
weighing of other considerations"). See generally Steele, Cleaning Up the Legal Profession: The
Power to Discipline-The Judiciary and the Legislature, 20 ARIz. L. REv. 413, 413-14 (1978);
Note, Lawyer Disciplinary Standards: Broad vs. Narrow Proscriptions, 65 IowA L. REv. 1386,
1386-409 (1980).
For a rare case dealing with the ethics of conduct undertaken by an attorney-candidate in the course
of a judicial campaign, see In re Donohoe, 90 Wn. 2d 173,580 P.2d 1093 (1978). Especially striking
in Donohoe is the severity of the candidate's ethical misfeasance, found sufficient to uphold two
reprimands. The first of these was for publishing, over the course of two separate campaign bids, a
series of deliberately false statements about actions taken by her incumbent opponents while on the
bench. Id. at 177-79, 580 P.2d at 1095-96. The second reprimand was for printing and circulating a
"doctored" version of a letter originally written by her opponent's reelection committee chairman.
As described by the court:
Appellant, without permission, cut, pasted and altered that letter and had it reproduced along
with her own campaign statement at the bottom ofthe page. The doctored letter included the
original letterhead . . . along with [the committee chairman's] signature. This was used as a
piece of campaign literature.
Appellant removed the essence of three paragraphs. She deleted reference to the King County
Bar poll wherein 81 percent had rated [the incumbent judge] as good or excellent while she
received less than 2 percent in those categories and 55 percent rated her poor. ...
Appellant then sent the altered letter to all King County taverns with the hope that it would be
publicly posted.
Id. at 182-83, 580 P.2d at 1098. For other cases concerning the campaign conduct of candidates in
judicial elections, see In re Baker, 218 Kan. 209, 542 P.2d 701 (1975); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 1362
(1958).
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2. Attorney Publicity
The CPR's restrictions on attorney publicity 18 comprise a second
source of ethical duties bearing on the issue of campaign activities. These
restrictions primarily concern the direct advertising methods used by
practitioners of law to solicit clients. Nevertheless, the advertising rules
are fully operative in the context of a judicial campaign and govern the
manner by which a candidate may use public communications in present-
ing his or her candidacy to the electorate. 19
The basic rule is that lawyers may not employ "any form of public
communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim." 20 In practice, only the prohi-
bition on self-laudatory statements should actually pose a significant limit
on the scope of proposed campaign acts. The use of false, fraudulent, or
deceptive communications in a campaign is probably aberrational. Fur-
ther, although there may arise close factual disputes about whether par-
ticular communications are misleading or unfair, few would argue with
the appropriateness of the basic rule as a general ethical standard. 21
The prohibition against self-laudatory statements, on the other hand, is
more likely to limit the campaigning attorney. The distinction between
self-praise and informing the public of one's qualifications is difficult to
draw both on a practical and a theoretical level. 22 Consistent with the pur-
18. CPRDR2-101.
19. This follows from the general applicability of the CPR to campaign activities. See note I
supra. The particular applicability to campaigning of the publicity restriction is further indicated by
the explicit treatment given to "political campaigns" in CPR DR 2-101(H)(1) (DR 2-101(F)(1) of
the Washington version). DR 2-101(H)(1) allows more freedom in a political campaign, however.
than if campaigns were regulated solely by DR 2-101(A). See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 546 (1962). reprinted in part in note 23
infra; cf. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, RECENT ETHICS OPINIONS. No.
1366 (1976) (attorney-candidate for United States Senate subjected to tests of legal ethics regarding
publicity in his campaign).
20. CPR DR 2-101(A). Another prohibition relevant to campaign publicity is DR 2-101(0) (DR
2-101(C) of the Washington version), banning payments by an attorney for "professional publicity
in a news item."
21. One could argue with the rule's appropriateness, however, not as a general ethical standard
but as an enforceable rule of election campaigns. Further, a system of democratic elections generally
leaves the determination of deceptiveness or falsity to the electorate.
22. For instance, it has been ruled that it is not self-laudatory for candidates to assert in campaign
publicity "the fact or contention that they have performed free legal services for various people" or
"that they have never turned down clients on the ground of impecuniosity or inability to pay a fee."
ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 795
(1965) (District Attorney race; Opinion was based on Canon 27 of the former Canons of Professional
Ethics, which contained a similar ban on self-laudation). Since the Committee recognized that such
remarks did not bear on the qualifications of the candidate to hold office, it is difficult to understand
how they could be characterized as anything other than "self-laudation." The result rested, appar-
ently, upon a finding that the remarks did not operate as indirect advertising for the candidate's pri-
vate law practice. See generally note 23 infra. Even this finding is questionable.
Judicial Campaigning
poses of the publicity restrictions, the guiding principle should be to pro-
hibit judicial candidates from indirectly advertising their own legal prac-
tices through representations of personal legal prowess made during the
course of a campaign. 23 In conflict with this principle, however, an indi-
vidual's ability as a practicing attorney obviously is relevant to whether
that person is desirable as a judge and, for this reason, should be com-
municated to the public.
The CPR offers little help in resolving this conflict. It simply author-
izes the identification of the candidate as a lawyer when done in a "lim-
ited and dignified" manner and when germane to a campaign issue.24 The
professional status of the candidate as a lawyer, however, may not be the
only qualification relevant to his or her desirability as a judge. Other mat-
ters should be allowed publicity so long as the publicized matter is rea-
sonably related to the duties of the office sought.25 In general, one might
question the realism of a rule that limits publicity in a campaign to pur-
poses other than that of boosting the esteem of the candidate in the eyes of
23. This derives from the traditional limit imposed upon attorney advertising. See, e.g., ABA
COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 546 (1962):
Canon 27 [of the former ABA Canons of Professional Ethics] prohibits direct, as well as
indirect advertisingfor professional employment. [The prohibition] is directed at any newspaper
releases designed directly or indirectly to accomplish the objective forbidden by the Canon, i.e.,
professional employment as a lawyer, thus directly or indirectly to further his professional inter-
ests as a lawyer.
Newspaper releases intended only to further the candidacy of a lawyer for a political office,
obviously are not forbidden by the Canon.
[T]he news releases must have the objective of furthering the candidacy of the lawyer for
political office only, and not be motivated for the purpose, directly or indirectly, of obtaining
professional employment as a lawyer.
In a similar vein, see WASHINGTON STATE BAR Ass'N LEGAL ETHICS COMM., OPINIONS, No. 93 (1961)
("It is proper for a lawyer's profession to be made known when he is running for office, but not to use
such language as 'outstanding' attorney in his advertising").
In the wake of the landmark case of Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), holding that blanket
suppressions of attorney advertising violate the free speech clause of the first amendment, the strin-
gency with which restrictions on advertising impinge upon the content of campaign publicity may
well have abated. See also note 25 infra. However, whatever restrictions on advertising still remain
should, pro tanto, apply as much to indirect forms of advertising, such as might arise in the context of
ajudicial campaign, as to direct advertising.
Note that the reference to self-laudatory statements has been eliminated from the section corre-
sponding to DR 2-101 in the proposed final draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, pro-
posed as an eventual replacement for the CPR. ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 7. 1(b) (Proposed Final Draft, May 30,
1981). Rather, the proposed new rule prohibits only those statements that are "likely to create an
unjustified expectation." Id.
24. CPR DR 2-101(H)(1) (DR 2-10I(F)(1) of the Washington version).
25. Any rule to the contrary would almost surely fail to survive a first amendment challenge. In
selecting the holder of a public office, the dissemination of relevant information is basic to the proper
functioning of the democratic process and hence is at the "core" of protected first amendment rights.
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the public. Presumably, the purpose of all campaign publicity is to in-
crease such esteem and, hence, is inherently self-laudatory. For this rea-
son, the CPR's advertising restrictions should "bend" to accommodate
the practical necessities of a democratic election. Nevertheless, an ethical
judicial candidate should beware of the potential for unethical abuse of
any such accommodation and should act to reasonably restrain the tone
with which campaign publicity thrusts his or her professional image upon
the electorate.
3. Limitations on Criticisms of the Incumbent
An attorney-candidate for a judicial post may discover ethical limits on
the criticisms he or she may direct at the incumbent opponent. The CPR
restricts criticisms of the bench made by members of the bar on two
grounds: first, that these tend to lessen public confidence in the legal sys-
tem; and second, that they are often unfair to the judge. 26
Because they undercut public faith in the courts, statements critical of
an incumbent are ethical only if justified by countervailing considera-
tions. Two such considerations operate in a judicial campaign: the right of
the public to an open debate of the candidates' qualifications; and the at-
torney-candidates' freedom of speech. 27
26. These concerns are evident primarily in CPR EC 8-6, which states in part:
Adjudicatory officials, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are entitled to receive the
support of the bar against unjust criticism. While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize such
officials publicly, he should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use appropriate language.
and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to lessen public
confidence in our legal system.
Id. (footnotes omitted). In addition, EC 9-6 imposes upon every attorney "a solemn duty . . . to
encourage respect for the law and for the courts and judges thereof." See also. e.g.. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Ky. 1980). cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981) (attorney
disciplined on basis of finding that his public criticism of a judge's ruling "tend[ed] to bring the
bench and bar into disrepute and to undermine public confidence in the judicial process"): In re
Raggio, 87 Nev. 369, 487 P.2d 499, 500 (1971) (finding that attorney's public criticisms had caused
the state supreme court to become "the center of controversy" and that "[essential public confi-
dence in our system of administering justice may have been eroded").
27. The Washington Supreme Court has acknowledged that these considerations may justify
campaign statements critical of an incumbent judge. In a disciplinary action against an attorney who.
as part of an unsuccessful attempt to unseat an incumbent judge, had deliberately misrepresented the
incumbent's judicial record and other matters, the court stated:
We are dealing with a delicate balancing of rights involving the public, the incumbent judge.
and the lawyer candidate for judicial office. On the one hand the courts, as an institution, are
entitled to the respect due to the office because the acceptance of judicial decisions ultimately
depends upon the citizens' belief in the integrity and impartiality of the courts. On the other
hand, the members of the judiciary are subject to legitimate and accurate criticism and evalua-
tion. A candidate for judicial office has a right to challenge an incumbent judge's ability, deci-
sions and judicial conduct, but it must be done fairly, accurately and upon facts, not false repre-
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The CPR implicitly recognizes that the public's right to an open debate
may justify criticism of the incumbent. This right is the correlative of the
duty expressed in EC 8-6 that "[l]awyers should protest earnestly against
the... election of those who are unsuited for the bench.... ",28 By these
terms, the incumbent is not immune from being made the subject of such
protests, nor is the challenging attorney barred from being the protester. 29
The principal ethical inquiry of the candidate should be whether a pro-
posed criticism is motivated by a desire to improve the legal system. This
is the underlying policy element that justifies permitting the criticism, 30
and EC 8-6 explicitly bans criticisms motivated by any other reason.
The CPR expressly recognizes that an attorney's freedom of speech
may justify public criticisms of the incumbent. 31 This exception, how-
ever, is narrowly construed against the complaining attorney. To be ethi-
cal, the benefits of free speech must remain greater than the costs to the
legal system associated with the candidate's criticisms. Consequently,
DR 8-102(B) prohibits accusations against a judge which are knowingly
false. 32 DR 8-102(B), however, states only the minimum conduct neces-
sary to avoid disciplinary sanction: to act ethically, a candidate who criti-
cizes the incumbent "should be certain of the merit of his complaint." 3 3
sentations. The voters are entitled to a fair statement and evaluation of the qualifications of the
candidates.
In re Donohoe, 90 Wn. 2d 173, 180, 580 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1978).
28. CPR EC 8-6. This right-duty relationship is premised, in the CPR, upon the apprehension of
a special vantage possessed by attorneys for evaluating the qualifications of candidates for the bench.
See id.
29. The right of a judicial candidate to direct criticism at an incumbent opponent is well estab-
lished. E.g., Thatcher v. United States, 212 F. 801, 807 (1914), appeal dismissed for lack ofjuris.,
241 U.S. 644 (1915); In re Baker, 218 Kan. 209, 542 P.2d 701, 706 (1975); In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D.
191, 75 N.W.2d 644, 648 (1956); In re Donohoe, 90 Wn. 2d 173, 181, 580 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1978);
ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 744
(1964).
30. EC 8-6 appears under the general admonition of Canon 8 that lawyers "Should Assist in
Improving the Legal System." See also note 28 and accompanying text supra.
31. "[A] lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize [adjudicatory] officials publicly .. " CPR
EC 8-6 (footnote omitted).
32. See also State v. Russell, 227 Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
983 (1981); In re Donohoe, 90 Wn. 2d 173, 181, 580 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1978) (citation omitted):
We agree that a person does not surrender freedom of expression rights when becoming a
licensed attorney. However, we do not believe that the First Amendment protects one who utters
a statement with knowledge of its falsity, even in the context of a judicial campaign. Such
speech is not beneficial to the public and is generally harmful to the person against whom it is
directed. The only beneficiary of the comment is the utterer thereof. On balance, such state-
ments are not deserving of constitutional protection.
33. CPR EC 8-6 (emphasis added), reprinted in part in note 26 supra. The manner in which a
criticism is framed must also be calculated to produce the minimum of harm: attorneys are admon-
ished to eschew pettiness in making their complaints and to employ "appropriate language" therein.
Id.
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The CPR likewise restricts criticisms of the bench on the grounds that
they are often unfair to the judge. 34 As the holder of a public office, an
incumbent judge clearly is subject to a public accounting for conduct dur-
ing the period of incumbency. This, however, does not justify accusa-
tions that do not address either the qualifications of the judge to remain in
office or a breach of some duty of office. Such accusations may be unfair
because of the judge's inability to respond publicly to criticisms concern-
ing matters that might appear before the judge in litigation. 35 Further,
unrestrained and unfair criticisms of the judiciary hamper the ability of
judges to maintain a proper judicial detachment. 36 Unjust criticisms of
judges, therefore, should be prohibited as a matter of social policy. Judi-
cial candidates should not publicly criticize their incumbent opponent un-
less the criticism is " 'well founded, on a high plane, factual, and not per-
sonal.' '37
4. Specific Campaign Directives
The CPR devotes scant attention to the specific issue of conduct in a
judicial campaign. However, the issue does receive treatment in two Dis-
ciplinary Rules under Canon 8.
The first of these bans the making of knowingly false statements of fact
about the qualifications of a rival candidate. 38 In the context of judicial
elections, this rule parallels the proscription on false accusations against a
judge, 39 but applies to statements made about non-incumbent candidates
as well.
The second rule is of considerably greater significance since it sum-
mons into operation important provisions of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct. DR 8-103 mandates compliance by attorney-candidates for judicial
office with the CJC's provisions on campaign conduct. 40 These provi-
34. Id.
35. Id. See also CJC Canon 3(C)(1) ("A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in
which has impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
36. "Judges should not be subjected to false allegations about particular decisions. A judge's
ability to render a reasoned decision should not be clouded by the fear that a challenger can twist
words or allege distorted facts in an election campaign." In re Donohoe, 90 Wn. 2d 173, 180. 580
P.2d 1093, 1097 (1978).
37. Id. at 181, 580 P.2d at 1097 (quoting R. WISE, LEGAL ETHics 21 (1966)). But see, e.g..
Thatcher v. United States, 212 F. 801, 807 (1914), appeal dismissedfor lack ofjuris., 241 U.S. 644
(1915) ("We cannot think that a lawyer citizen's criticism . . . must needs be confined to what is
'decent and respectful.' His criticism may be as indecent and disrespectful as the facts justify").
38. CPR DR 8-102(A).
39. CPR DR 8-102(B).
40. See generally notes 49-58 and accompanying text infra. DR 8-103 was not a part of the
original'version of the CPR, but was adopted by the ABA as an amendment in 1971. Only 13 states
have subsequently incorporated DR 8-103 into their versions of the CPR. see NATIONAL CENTER FOR
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sions are thereby incorporated into the CPR and constitute an authorita-
tive general guide to campaign conduct that is applicable to incumbent
and non-incumbent judicial candidates alike.
B. The Code of Judicial Conduct41
The CJC is the primary source of ethical law applicable to the cam-
paign activities of incumbent candidates. 42 Like the CPR, the CJC con-
tains standards of general conduct that do not specifically address the
question of campaign conduct. Consequently, each judicial candidate
must individually ascertain what bearing these general rules might have
upon the conduct of his or her campaign. Unlike the CPR, however, the
CJC also devotes a considerable amount of attention to the manner of
conduct of judicial campaigns. These directives, contained in Canon 7B,
set out both general standards of campaign conduct and specific rules with
which all candidates must comply.
1. General CJC Directives
The CJC's general directives operate, in a manner parallel to those of
the CPR, 43 to ensure that the bench presents a decorous public face. This
overriding concern is particularly visible in Canon 2, 44 which directs a
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE at x, 929L-68L
(1980), but non-incumbent candidates are generally held to the same standards as are incumbent
candidates even without express provision. See, e.g., ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 312 (1964); Committee on Professional and Judicial
Ethics, Ethical Guidelinesfor Judicial Campaigns, 28 REc. A.B. CITY NEw YORK 364, 364 (1973).
41. See generally note 7 supra.
42. By its terms, the CJC applies to "anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a
judicial system performing judicial functions." Preamble to CJC. However, the campaign provisions
of CJC Canon 7B are expressly made applicable to attorney-candidates for judicial office by CPR DR
8-103, and upon judicial candidates generally by CJC 7B(1).
43. See note I 1 and accompanying text supra.
44. "A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of His Activi-
ties." The assumed causal link between appearances of propriety and public confidence in the bench
is explicitly treated in the Commentary to Canon 2, which states that "[p]ublic confidence in the
judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by judges," and requires that a judge "must
avoid all impropriety and appearances of impropriety" (emphasis added). Further concern in Canon
2 with proper appearances is apparent in paragraph (B), which proscribes any act by a judge that
might "convey the impression that [others] are in a special position to influence him."
Other Canons of the CJC reflect this basic concern. Canon 1 states that a judge should observe
"high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved"
and that the provisions of the Code "should be construed and applied to further that objective." To
this same purpose, CJC Canons 4 and 5 both restrict a judge's extrajudicial activities to those which
"do not reflect adversely upon his impartiality." CJC Canon 5B.
See also, e.g., Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 789, 797, 532
P.2d 1209, 1216, 1222, 119 Cal. Rptr. 841, 848, 854 (1975) (municipal judge removed from office
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judge to "conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
Given the purpose of protecting appearances, two considerations sug-
gest that the standards of conduct applicable to judges under the CJC
should be stricter than those applicable under the CPR to lawyers in gen-
eral. First, judges are subject to a greater degree of public scrutiny than
are other lawyers. 45 Second, because of its judgmental role in society, the
bench is the facet of the legal profession that is most vulnerable to criti-
cism and public depreciation. This warrants greater protective precau-
tions in the form of stricter standards of conduct. 46
In the context of a judicial election, however, a non-incumbent candi-
date should not be held to a lower standard of conduct than an incumbent.
Fairness to the incumbent provides a good reason why non-incumbent
candidates should be subject to the same high standard of conduct. Be-
sides fairness to the incumbent, the other reasons for permitting more lax
standards for non-judges are less compelling in the case of a judicial can-
didate. For example, both non-incumbent and incumbent are subject to a
high degree of public exposure, and both have similar power to reflect
pejoratively on the judiciary's integrity. 47 Hence, recognizing a single
on basis, inter alia, that his "giving the finger or digitus impudicus" in reprimanding a defendant for
tardiness in arriving for a proceeding constituted "conduct prejudicial to public esteem for the judi-
cial office"); In re Hardt, 72 N.J. 160, 369 A.2d 5, 8-9 (1977); Lonschein v. Sate Comm'n on
Judicial Conduct, 50 N.Y.2d 569, 572, 408 N.E.2d 901, 902, 430 N.Y.S.2d 571. 572 (1980)
("Members of the judiciary should be acutely aware that any action they take, whether on or off the
bench, must be measured against exacting standards of scrutiny to the end that public perception of
the integrity of the judiciary will be preserved").
45. Judges "must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny." Conmentary to CJC
Canon 2. This extraordinary scrutiny is due, in part, to judges' fiduciary role in respect of their office.
and in part to judges' greater public visibility.
46. There are indications that these considerations do in fact operate in the CJC to determine the
applicable standard of conduct. The Commentary to Canon 2 states that a judge, by virtue of his
subjection to "constant public scrutiny," must consequently "accept restrictions on his conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen." By this logic, it may be inferred that the
CJC's standards are more restrictive than those which bind an ordinary lawyer under the CPR. since
the ordinary lawyer is more like the ordinary citizen in drawing public scrutiny. Further, while the
CJC and CPR both impose duties of "high standards of conduct," the statement of this duty is in the
CJC more closely predicated upon assumed vulnerabilities of the legal system. Compare, e.g., CJC
Canon I with CPR EC 1-5. See generally notes I 1 & 44 supra. Arguably, this evidences recognition
of the greater vulnerability of the bench to public depreciation than of the bar generally.
Consistent with this interpretation of the CJC, a number of courts have stated that judges are sub-
ject to a higher standard of conduct than lawyers generally. See Geiler v. Commission on Judicial
Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 287, 515 P.2d I, 12, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201, 212 (1973), cert. denied.
417 U.S. 932 (1974); In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 517 (Fla. 1977); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v.
Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E.2d 476, 482 (1972); In re Piper, 271 Or. 726, 534 P.2d 159.
164 (1975); In re Douglas, 135 Vt. 585,382 A.2d 215,219 (1977).
47. Cf. Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Ethical Guidelines for Judicial Cam-
paigns, 28 REc. A.B. CITY NEw YORK 364 (1973):
While it is recognized that a candidate must have political and legal views that will inevitably
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standard of general conduct for all candidates alike would better serve the
overall purposes of legal ethics. Consistent with these purposes, that stan-
dard should be the stricter one implicit in the CJC.
Apart from this stricter standard, the evaluation of the ethics of a candi-
date's campaign conduct should proceed through the same analysis as
under the CPR's general mandates. 48 Conduct inimical to the appearance
of judicial integrity is ethical only if justified by the weight of countervail-
ing considerations. Such a preponderance will be harder to meet for a
judicial candidate than for an ordinary, non-candidate attorney: since the
CJC's general ethical standards are stricter than those of the CPR, depar-
tures from the former will be justified in fewer circumstances.
2. Explicit Campaign Directives of Canon 7B
CJC Canon 7B is the only rule of legal ethics that attempts a compre-
hensive, explicit treatment of the question of ethical judicial campaign-
ing. This explicitness makes it the most authoritative guideline to ethical
campaign conduct. 49 It deals with the general ethical standard applicable
to all candidates as well as several explicit rules governing particular in-
stances of campaign activities .50
Section (1)(a) of Canon 7B directs that all judicial candidates should
"maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office" in the conduct of
their campaigns. This requirement aims to preserve the judiciary's ap-
pearance of propriety, an objective that lies at the heart of the CJC. 51
Conformity with this objective thereby is expressly made a general guide-
line by which the ethics of all candidates, including non-incumbents, are
to be judged. Hence, CJC 7B(1)(a) expressly confers upon all candidates
affect his judicial decisions, there is a danger that pronouncement of the views may be construed
as a promise or indication of the manner in which the candidate would decide cases as a judge or
may later embarrass the candidate in the decision of a particular case and may create the impres-
sion that the judge is not approaching the case as an "open minded weigher of law and facts." In
light of these dangers and in view of the uncertain value to the electorate of statements on the
general attitudes and philosophy of a candidate, he should not announce his views on disputed
legal or political issues if it is foreseeable that such issues may bear on a case that may at some
future time come before him if he is elected.
Id. at 367 (footnotes omitted).
48. See generally text accompanying note 16 supra.
49. It is authoritative also in the sense that compliance-with CJC Canon 7B is mandated by CPR
DR 8-103.
50. In addition to these two matters, Canon 7B also deals with matters collateral to the issue of
campaign behavior. These include the manner of dealing with campaign contributions and the con-
duct of a candidate's family members and others when acting to promote a candidate's election.
51. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
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the duty of upholding the CJC's standard of general ethics, which is stric-
ter than that of the CPR. 52
The rules dealing with explicit instances of campaign conduct, 53 in
substance, simply apply the CJC's general duty of protecting judicial ap-
pearances to the campaign setting. These rules prohibit the use of certain
types of assertions by a candidate in the course of a campaign: (I) pledges
or promises of conduct in office; (2) expressions of view on disputed legal
or political issues; and (3) misrepresentations of the candidate's qualifica-
tions or other facts. 54
Campaign statements are unethical if they create the impression that
the candidate would administer the judicial office with bias or partiality if
elected. Two of the three proscriptions in CJC 7B(l)(c) are directed to-
ward such campaign statements. Pledges and promises of conduct in of-
fice, other than the pledge of faithful execution of official duties, tend to
subvert the appearances of judicial impartiality and judicial dignity essen-
tial to public faith in the courts. 55 Similarly, a candidate's expression of
views on a disputed legal issue puts into question the candidate's impar-
tiality should that particular issue come up before him or her once
elected. 56 Hence, by prohibiting such statements, these rules fall wholly
within the purposes implicit in the CJC's general ethical standard.
52. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
53. CJC 7B(l)(c).
54. Id. This Canon states:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for ajudicial office....
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impar-
tial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political
issues: or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact.
55. A campaign statement such as "'I favor pro-abortion rulings" or "I favor use of the death
penalty" carries an implicit pledge of conduct in office that affects the public's perception of the
judiciary's impartiality and integrity. See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESStONAL RESPONSIIL-
ITY. RECENT ETHICS OPINtONS, No. 1444 (1980) (the slogan, "A strict sentencing philosophy!." used
as part ofajudicial campaign, is a pledge of conduct in violation ofCJC 7B(1)(c)).
56. But cf. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). wherein Jus-
tice Rehnquist, despite the fact that he had, shortly before his nomination to the Court. made strong
public assertions on the merits of a certain case, insisted nevertheless on participating in the decision
of the case. The plaintiff-respondent had moved for the Justice's recusal. arguing:
Under the circumstances of the instant case. Mr. Justice Rehnquist's impartiality is clearly
questionable because of his appearance as an expert witness for the Justice Department in Senate
hearings inquiring into the subject matter of the case, because of his intimate knowledge of the
evidence underlying the respondents' allegations, and because of his public statements about the
lack of merit in respondents' claims.
Id. at 824. Justice Rehnquist based his decision to participate upon his reading of the requirements of
the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1976). on an analysis of prior Court practice. and on an aversion
to permitting the alternative result of affirmance by an equally divided court. However, he distin-
guished from his situation the circumstances wherein such statements are made by an individual after
nomination to the bench-circumstances more akin to those of a judicial candidate. 409 U.S. at 836
n.5.
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The same is true of the third subpart of Canon 7B(1)(c), which prohi-
bits a candidate's misrepresentation of his or her qualifications. It is ap-
parent, even without reference to Canon 7B(l)(c), that such misrepresen-
tation is a violation of ethics under both the CPR and CJC. 57 The
principal value of Canon 7B to the candidate, therefore, is that it deals in
an explicit and authoritative manner with particular ethical situations with
which the candidate must be concerned.
These considerations of the explicit campaigning rules of Canon
7B(1)(c) suggest possible limits upon the reach of these rules, not other-
wise apparent. The set of activities proscribed by the Canon should be
narrowly defined by interpreting the "black letter" statement of these
rules in accordance with the underlying purposes of the CJC. 58 Campaign
acts, including pledges or expressions of views touching legal matters,
should be permitted unless they affront these basic purposes. Canon 7B
should be understood as an application, not an extension, of the basic rule
that lawyers not unduly harm the prestige of the legal system.
III. IS CAMPAIGNING AN ETHICAL ACTIVITY?
Members of the public register their social policy preferences by means
of partisan political elections. Consequently, a candidate who aspires to
political office has a burden of persuading members of the general public
that his or her views on social policy are representative of their own. 59
Logically, this compels the result that the rhetoric of political campaigns
consists largely of candidates expressing views on social policy issues.
The propriety of such expressions in judicial campaigns is, however,
highly questionable. The ethical duties of the CPR and CJC limit the ac-
tivities that may be undertaken in promoting candidates for judicial of-
fice. CJC Canon 7B, in particular, pares down the liberty of candidates to
57. See, e.g., CPR DR 1-102(A)(4); CJC Canon 1.
58. See, e.g., In re Baker, 218 Kan. 209, 542 P.2d 701, 705 (1975); Committee on Professional
and Judicial Ethics, Ethical Guidelines for Judicial Campaigns, 28 REc. A.B. CrrY NEW YORK 364,
371 n.25 (1973):
Canon 7(B)(1)(c) would appear to prohibit a candidate from any announcement of his views on
disputed legal or political issues. We believe a candidate should be free to express his views on
issues that do not foreseeably bear on any case that may come before him as a judge, such as
certain aspects ofjudicial administration.
59. This narrow view of the political process disregards the elements of personality and character
in campaigning. Especially in a relatively non-ideological country like the United States, candidates
are often elected because of who they are-their character-as well as for what they stand. But cf.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) (narrow view of the political process as a forum in which
factions of the public compete in promoting particular interests). Legal ethics has no special bearing
on this aspect of the election process. See note 61 infra. Accordingly, this aspect of campaigning is
beyond the scope of this comment.
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make campaign assertions which, if made in a partisan political election,
would be wholly proper. 60 A consistent adherence to the policy underly-
ing these rules of legal ethics would bar any statement by a judicial candi-
date of his or her position on controverted social policy issues. 61
Effective administration of the law depends upon the maintenance of
public faith in the legal system. For this reason, an attorney's conduct that
unduly harms public faith in the legal system is professionally unethical.
This is the tenet underlying all of the ethical provisions surveyed above
and in general justifying interference by the court with the professional
liberty of an attorney.
In turn, public faith in the legal system rests principally upon the ap-
pearance of judicial impartiality. The model of an impartial judiciary is
based on a concept of "law" as an abstract entity operating through the
determinism of reason, rather than by the free discretion of judges accord-
ing to their personal social policy views. 62 CJC restrictions upon a
60. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text supra.
61. Much of the public is aware of that which all lawyers know: value judgments play an impor-
tant role in judicial decision-making. The result argued for here is not to prohibit consideration in a
campaign of judicial candidates' "values.' Arguably, the purpose of state constitutional provisions
for the election of judges includes permitting the public to select judges, in part, on the basis of those
values. Hence, the electorate may have a strong and constitutionally sanctioned interest in securing
information about candidates' values.
As used here, however, the term "values" refers to the candidates' innate attributes of character
and judgment-not to their sentiments and predispositions on legislative-type matters of social pol-
icy. Publication of such predispositions does not comport with the model of unbiasedness contained
in the constitutional grant of the judicial power to the courts. Therefore, the protected informational
interest of the electorate, if any, does not reach information about the candidates' predispositions on
such public policy questions. Further, an additional purpose of the constitutional provision for judi-
cial elections is, arguably, to further the insulation of the legal system from the influence of political
factions, since judges otherwise would be political appointees. If so, then arguments based on the
constitutional provision for judicial elections militate against candidates running on the basis of pub-
lic policy issues more appropriately within the legislative domain.
It might be further objected that restraining judicial candidates from campaigning on the basis of
public policy issues infringes their first amendment liberties. However, there is a distinction between
the utterance of such statements in a partisan political election-clearly protected speech-and utter-
ance by a candidate for judicial office. First, unlike in a partisan political election, the publication by
a judicial candidate of his or her predispositions on controverted social policy issues is of itself harm-
ful to the state interest-preservation of faith in the impartiality of its courts. Second. in the case of a
judicial election, no general public benefit flows from such debate since the asserted matters are, or
should be, irrelevant.
62. This conception of the legal system is, in its strongest form, one of "natural law." a theory
of jurisprudence which maintains that the validity of a rule of law derives from "'moral" or ethical
factors existing wholly apart from the influence of personalities or institutions. See T. BENDrl-r. LAW
AS RULE AND PRINCIPLE 91-92, 93 (1978); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 182 (1961). For
general discussions of the natural law approach to legal theory. see T. BENDrr'r. supra. at 90-116: L.
FULLER, supra note 13. at 96-106; H.L.A. HART. supra. at 181-207. For an expression of a natural
law approach in the context of litigation, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (concerning the requirements of 14th amendment due process in a state crimi-
nal proceeding):
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judge's extrajudicial activities, including campaign activities, operate so
as to protect this concept. 63 Any representation by a judge that the out-
come of litigation is a function of his or her personal social policies is
inimical to this concept of law, upon which rests the appearance of judi-
cial impartiality. Adherence to the purposes underlying legal and judicial
ethics implies that such representations should be deemed unethical.
These same considerations are present in the case of a candidate for
judicial office. Making a public assertion on an issue implies that the can-
didate's views are relevant to the manner of performance of the office
sought. Hence, assertions by judicial candidates of their views on dis-
puted issues represent that such personal views are relevant to deciding
cases. Such a representation undercuts the policy behind legal ethics to
the same extent it would if made by a judge. For these reasons, the pro-
scription of CJC 7B(1)(c) on announcements of a candidate's "views on
disputed legal or political issues" should be strictly construed to prohibit
any statement of position by a candidate for judicial office on a matter of
social policy.
Expressions by judicial candidates of their views on controverted pub-
lic policy issues undermine the appearance of judicial impartiality. The
interests of the legal system deserve priority over the ambitions of indi-
vidual candidates. It is not unreasonable to require that an individual who
is seeking to be made one of the guardians of the legal system act so as to
protect that system in the means he or she employs in seeking election. 64
But neither does the application of the Due Process Clause imply that judges are wholly at large.
The judicial judgment in applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits of ac-
cepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal
judgment. The fact that judges among themselves may differ whether in a particular case a trial
offends accepted notions of justice is not disproof that general rather than idiosyncratic standards
are applied.
Campaign commeitary on substantive legal or other public issues implies that "law" has no self-
subsisting reality, but is merely "what judges say it is--the position which is taken, in fact, by the
school of legal "realism." The "natural law" school of legal philosophy comports best with the
purposes of professional ethics, however, and supports most strongly the result urged in this com-
ment.
63. See CJC Canons 4, 5, 7.
64. Doctrinally, the result argued for in this comment may be achieved by applying CJC
7B(l)(c), particularly the second clause, in strict compliance with the underlying purpose of legal
ethics-maintenance of public faith in the legal system. Note that the result argued for would not
deprive a judicial candidate of the right to present a vigorous campaign. For example, vigorous de-
bate on the qualifications of the candidates does not contradict the basic purpose, assuming compli-
ance with other ethical requirements. See, e.g., In re Baker, 218 Kan. 209, 542 P.2d 701, 705 (1975)
("In our view, the health, work habits, experience and ability of the [judicial] candidates are all
matters of legitimate concern to the electorate who must make the choice"). Nor would the urged
result necessarily cut off all debate on the manner of administration of the judicial office, since not all




Ultimately, courts are powerless to impose upon members of the bar,
in their capacity as officers of the court, a requirement that they adhere to
high ethical standards. 65 But, particularly where the office of judge is
being aspired to, the calling is one to which high ethics are well suited.
The ethical standards expected of the profession are set out in the CPR
and the CJC. These codes suggest that statements of views on social poli-
cies by judicial candidates are unethical and should not be permitted.
While this conclusion restricting speech appears, perhaps, contrary to the
result that might be expected in a country with a tradition of free political
speech and democratic elections, nevertheless this conclusion comports
with a proper view of the judiciary as an apolitical institution purposely
separated by the constitution from the political branches of government.
Information relevant to the proper execution of the duties of a judgeship
should be all that the electorate requires. The peculiarity that we elect our
judges does not occasion cause to deviate from the requirement of ethical
conduct.
J. Scott Gar3
65. "There is no way by which the law can compel a man to live up to the excellences of which
he is capable." L. FULLER, supra note 13, at 9.
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